Range (by) David Epstein

The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.  

F. Scott Fitzgerald 

Took up this book called "Range: Why generalists triumph in a specialized world" by David Epstein. With the diet of Gladwell (10 k hours rule), I am used to the Talent is overrated notion and so this book was a "binary jolt". I reasonably believed, you should get to the stadium as early as you can and practice, get closer and closer to "pole position" and give your best shot to be successful (pick-n-stick approach).

While that approach tells you that earlier you start the better, suddenly, you come across a proposition which is orthogonal, making it difficult to digest. Eventually got over it and I think he has some germane points to make his side of the case.

Of course, I did have a modicum of reservation about the early start approach, since if it was that straightforward, almost everyone would have followed suit. Such a mild side eyed doubt helps you to keep the balance. Another interesting thing is that, Gladwell himself has a comment about this book saying "being told that everything I thought about something was wrong".

He like Gladwell,refers with the same Tiger Woods (as an example to start very early with a laser focus) and next he takes Roger Federer who experimented with several  ball games before he settled on Tennis.

You can appreciate the examples because it is almost contemporary (not from History books) and establishes the context for full "range". 

He takes up some fascinating and compelling stories where sticking to the expertise did backfire or even fatal as in the case of Montana fire accident where the fire fighters refused to give up their tools and ends up dying.He also talks about Para jumpers' episode - where thinking on the usual lines would not have yielded such a decision. In order to save space for the injured soldiers and emergency medical supplies, the key person makes the most important decision of his life - to stay back and guide the team rather than going with them. They were always trained as a super close knit team, the very idea is unbelievable and unthinkable. But in the end, mission worked out well. The captain would later remark "If something bad happens and if the officer is not there, think of explaining to 10 families" - a shuddering thought even as a reader.

He takes NASA challenger disaster in detail in order to explain how the culture "In God we trust, all others bring data" did not help. He explains well how to balance the risks that two extremes generate: That is, "mindless conformity" and "reckless deviation". He quotes Richard Feynman when he investigated the challenger disaster "When you don't have data, you have to use reason".

Author gives many data points and anecdotal evidence to support the fact that experts are no better forecasters than normal people. He adds a neat corollary that "Good forecasters are good belief updater. If they make a bet and lose, they embrace the logic of loss just as they embrace the reinforcement of win". When there is a dearth of data, he suggests "sense making" rather than decision making. He says, if I take a decision, will take pride in it and defend it whereas if I try to make sense, it would entail listening to others and goes on to say "Hunches to be held lightly". This is akin to futurist Paul Saffo's remark on forecasting "Strong views held lightly".

Our personalities change over time. Specializing too early has its disadvantages since THAT person has not yet arrived. Most of the significant changes occur during the ages 18-20 and then in late 20's. His repeat point is, when a specialist encounters novel or unfamiliar situations, they would not consider eschewing their experience entirely which usually result in a disaster (but I wonder how many times when you play chess Queen sacrifice for example is required and that too at a tournament level to win the game). He quips that, patient has more chances of living when cardiologists caucus because common treatments with dubious effects are less likely to be performed - apparently there is enough data to support this claim.

In his book Frames-of-mind, Howard Garder observes, "If a particular behavior is considered important by culture, nearly every normal individual would attain impressive level of competence". All of us can cite many examples to support this conclusion - for example, now a days, being plain mobile phone user just to make calls to mobile savvy like using exotic apps in the mobile phone. In this era of super-heated competition, starting early resonates with society more than broad brush and later deep dive - except that one will be unprepared for unexpected turns.

In systems theory, one of the key maxims on the risk side is: "Aggregation gives protection against UNKNOWN. Specialization gives protection against KNOWN". But then, wisdom lies in acceptance of this mutual spectrum.

We have to take a pick between Unknown and Known - all the best. 

Thanks for reading this far.

regards,

madhu